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LOSING THE LOSS CALCULATION: TOWARD
A MORE JUST SENTENCING REGIME IN
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL CASES
DERICK R. VOLLRATH†
ABSTRACT
The sentencing regime that governs white-collar criminal cases
requires reform. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommend
sentences that are generally too high and place a grossly
disproportionate emphasis on the concept of “loss”—the dollar value
of the harm that a court finds a white-collar criminal to have caused.
This concept of loss is ill defined, and often artificial to the point of
being arbitrary. Moreover, the loss calculation fails to adequately
approximate a defendant’s culpability, dwarfing traditionally relevant
considerations such as the manner in which the defendant committed
the crime and the defendant’s motive for doing so.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has recently opened the door to
systemic reform. In Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that—at least in certain circumstances—a sentencing judge may
deviate from a Guidelines recommendation based purely on policy
disagreement with that guideline. This Note argues that sentencing
judges should adopt an aggressive interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s Kimbrough opinion and exercise their newly rediscovered
discretion to deemphasize the loss calculation and restore rationality
to the sentencing of white-collar criminals.
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INTRODUCTION
Richard Adelson is no Bernie Madoff, but the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines don’t account for this distinction.
Bernie Madoff will perhaps be remembered as one of the most
loathsome white-collar criminals in history. Over the course of twenty
1
years, Madoff ran a Ponzi scheme that defrauded thousands of
2
people of tens of billions of dollars. His conduct was brazen. In
addition to stealing from hedge funds and banks, Madoff targeted
3
universities, charitable organizations, and individuals. When meeting
with a worried widow whose husband had invested his life savings
with Madoff, Madoff put his arms around the widow and assured her
4
that her money was safe. Her concerns assuaged, the widow doubled
down, investing both her pension fund and her own retirement
5
savings with Madoff’s firm. Now, her money is gone and she has been
6
forced to sell her home. Madoff appears to have been motivated
purely by greed. He comingled his victim’s investments with his
personal accounts and used the funds to pay for lavish personal
expenditures, including a Manhattan apartment, two yachts, and four
7
country club memberships.
Madoff was evil, but Richard Adelson was merely weak. Adelson
served as president of Impath, a publicly traded company that
8
specialized in the detection and diagnosis of cancer. During the
course of his employment at Impath, Adelson uncovered a
sophisticated accounting fraud that had been designed by various
Impath accounting executives to misstate the company’s financial
9
results to inflate the value of the company’s stock. Rather than
report the fraud, however, Adelson chose to conceal it and thus
10
joined the conspiracy. Adelson was a latecomer to the fraud. His

1. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 43, United States v. Madoff, 626 F. Supp. 2d. 420
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2009) (No. 09 Crim. 213 (DC)).
2. See id. (observing that estimates of the loss Madoff caused ranged from $13 billion to
$65 billion).
3. See id. at 44 (observing that Madoff’s investors included “individuals, charities, pension
funds, [and] institutional clients”).
4. Id. at 48.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 45.
8. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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participation was not based on greed or a desire to benefit by inflating
the company’s earnings; rather, “as President of the company, he
feared the effects of exposing what he had belatedly learned was the
11
substantial fraud perpetrated by others.”
Bernie Madoff and Richard Adelson are different kinds of
criminals. Considered through the lens of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, however, Adelson’s and Madoff’s conduct is substantially
identical. The amount of loss that a white-collar defendant is found to
have caused largely drives the determination of his recommended
12
sentencing range under the Guidelines. Because both Adelson and
13
the lengthy terms
Madoff committed high-dollar frauds,
recommended by the Guidelines effectively consign both to a lifetime
in prison when sentences for multiple counts are imposed
14
consecutively.
Despite these flaws, the Guidelines continue to dominate
sentencing. Although the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines no
15
longer mandatory in United States v. Booker, judges still adhere to
the Guidelines with roughly the same frequency as before the Booker
16
decision. A “culture of mandated guidelines” continues to permeate
17
the federal sentencing regime.
Recent developments, however, may provide an opportunity for
systemic change. In December 2007, the Supreme Court’s decision in
18
Kimbrough v. United States authorized a deviation from the

11. Id. at 513.
12. See infra Part II.B.1.
13. In Adelson’s case, the sentencing court concluded that Adelson intended a loss of
between $50 million and $100 million. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 510. Bernie Madoff was
found to have caused a loss in the tens of billions. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note
1, at 43.
14. In Adelson’s case, Judge Rakoff observed at sentencing that the Guidelines yielded an
offense level calculation of forty-six, which corresponds to a recommendation of life
imprisonment. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 510–11. Rakoff further observed that a life sentence
was effectively available in Adelson’s case because Adelson was charged with five separate
counts and the penalties could effectively be stacked to yield a sentence of eighty-five years in
prison. Id. Bernie Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison. Transcript of Sentencing
Hearing, supra note 1, at 49.
15. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
16. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 46 (2006) (“The conformance rate remained stable
throughout the year that followed Booker.”); see also infra Part II.A.2.
17. Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 731, 732 (2007).
18. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
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Guidelines based primarily on a sentencing judge’s policy
19
disagreement with their recommendation. The Kimbrough holding
significantly expands a judge’s discretion in sentencing certain drug
20
offenders, and may open the door to policy-based discretion in the
sentencing of white-collar criminal defendants.
This Note considers the potential ramifications of the Court’s
Kimbrough holding for the sentencing of white-collar criminal
defendants. Specifically, this Note argues that the sentencing regime
in white-collar criminal proceedings is deeply flawed. The Guidelines
recommend sentences that are generally too severe and place
disproportionate weight on the loss calculation—the amount of loss
the court attributes to a defendant. Kimbrough may provide an
important avenue for reform. Whereas Kimbrough’s immediate
21
holding concerned crack cocaine offenses, the Court’s reasoning can
and should be applied to white-collar crime. Such systemic policybased discretion would permit sentencing judges to deemphasize the
loss calculation, and thereby move toward a more just sentencing
regime in white-collar criminal cases.
In presenting this argument, this Note will proceed in four Parts.
Part I will examine the history of the Guidelines, discussing the
Sentencing Commission’s policy choices at the Guidelines’ inception
and the development of the Guidelines governing white-collar crime
over the past two decades. Part II will examine the current status of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, concluding that, post-Booker, the
Guidelines’ recommendations have remained the most important
determinant of a defendant’s sentence. Part II will then focus on the
Guidelines applicable to white-collar crime, concluding that the most
important factor at sentencing is the loss calculation. Part III will
make the case that the sentencing regime in white-collar criminal
cases is in need of reform. It will argue that the Guidelines
recommend sentences that are generally too high and that the

19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. Prior to the Court’s Kimbrough decision, seven circuit courts of appeal had held that
sentencing courts could not deviate from the Guidelines’ recommendations based on a
disagreement with the disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine. See Kimbrough, 128 S.
Ct. at 566 n.4 (observing this holding in United States v. Leatch, 482 F.3d 790, 791 (5th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam), United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 2007), United States v.
Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 361 (2d Cir. 2006), United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1369 (11th
Cir. 2006), United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275–76 (7th Cir. 2006), United States v. Eura, 440
F.3d 625, 633–34 (4th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2006)).
21. Id. at 564.
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Guidelines’ emphasis on the loss calculation distracts from the
purposes of sentencing. Part IV will discuss the Supreme Court’s
holding in Kimbrough v. United States. It will conclude that, even
under a narrow interpretation, Kimbrough can and should apply to
the sentencing of white-collar criminals, allowing judges to move
away from the Sentencing Guidelines’ disproportionate emphasis on
loss.
I. THE INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDELINES
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were developed to achieve
22
greater uniformity among sentences for federal crimes. Although
most of the guidelines were calibrated according to the typical past
23
practice of the sentencing courts before the Guidelines era, those
governing white-collar crimes were designed to produce short but
24
definite sentences. Since the Guidelines’ inception, however,
25
sentences for white-collar crimes have trended dramatically upward,
and now bear little relation to their former selves.
A. The Guidelines at Their Inception
1. The Guidelines Generally. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
were developed to remedy the prevalence of unwarranted sentencing
26
disparity. Before the Guidelines, sentences for substantially similar
27
federal crimes varied across regional, racial, and gender lines. To
address this concern, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime

22. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988).
23. Id. at 17.
24. Id. at 20–21.
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. Breyer, supra note 22, at 4–5.
27. For example, defendants convicted in the South were likely to serve a sentence six
months longer than the national average, whereas defendants convicted in central California
would likely serve a sentence twelve months shorter. Breyer, supra note 22, at 5 (citing
Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 676 (1987) (statement of Ilene H. Nagel, Comm’r, U.S. Sentencing
Commission)). Female bank robbers were likely to serve six months fewer than similarly
situated male bank robbers. Id. at 5 (citing Sentencing Guidelines, supra, at 676). Black
defendants faired more poorly in the South than they did in other regions of the country. Id.
(citing Sentencing Guidelines, supra, at 676–77). Sentences even varied widely between different
judges in the same circuit. One study of judges in the Second Circuit revealed that sentences in
identical cases could range from three to twenty years in prison, depending on which judge
presided over sentencing. Id. at 4–5 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41 n.22 (1984)).
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28

Control Act of 1984, which created the U.S. Sentencing Commission
29
(Commission) and charged it with developing a sentencing policy
that would achieve greater sentencing uniformity and comport with
congressionally prescribed purposes of sentencing. The Act codified
30
these purposes at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
In 1987, the Commission enacted the first U.S. Sentencing
31
Guidelines,
which emerged as a compromise among the
32
Commission’s members. The Commissioners divided on the
purposes of punishment; some wished to emphasize deterrence
33
rationales whereas others focused on punishment’s retributive value.
Further factions emerged within these camps because neither the
proponents of retribution nor the proponents of deterrence could
agree on a sentencing regime that adequately met their respective
34
purposes.
In response to these problems, the Sentencing Commission
decided to base the Guidelines primarily on the typical past practice
35
of the sentencing courts. The Commission ascertained the factors
that drove sentencing before the Guidelines by analyzing
approximately 100,000 case histories—10,500 of which probation
36
officers examined in detail. Based on this data, the Commission

28. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1837,
1976–2194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
29. See id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 1976–2026 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98
(2006)).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A). Section 3553(a), discussed in more detail infra, Part II.A.2, is
a congressional statement of the purposes of sentencing that was enacted as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. The statute states that sentences should be
sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the traditional retributive and deterrent
aims of the criminal justice system. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (describing the need for a
sentence to “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” provide “just punishment,” and “afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”).
31. See Breyer, supra note 22, at 1 (“Since November 1987, the new Federal Sentencing
Guidelines have been law.” (footnotes omitted)).
32. Id. at 17.
33. See id. at 15–16 (“[S]ome students of the criminal justice system strenuously urged the
Commission to follow what they call a ‘just deserts’ approach to punishment. . . . An alternative
school of thought recommended that the Guidelines be based on models of deterrence.”).
34. See id. at 17 (observing that the Commission was “[f]aced, on the one hand, with those
who advocated ‘just deserts’ but could not produce a convincing, objective way to rank criminal
behavior in detail, and, on the other hand, with those who advocated ‘deterrence’ but had no
convincing empirical data linking detailed and small variations in punishment to prevention of
crime”).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 18.

VOLLRATH IN FINAL 2.DOC

2010]

LOSING THE LOSS CALCULATION

1/5/2010 2:42:40 AM

1007

identified the factors that mattered in pre-Guidelines sentencing and
calibrated the Guidelines so that the presence or absence of those
factors would yield the same sentence as it would have in the typical
37
case before the Guidelines were enacted. In this manner, the
Commission was able to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing
without confronting the deep-seated philosophical tensions that
38
underlie the criminal justice system.
2. The Guidelines Governing White-Collar Crime.
The
Commission explicitly rejected the typical past practice of sentencing
39
courts in the case of white-collar crime. In its analysis of the preGuidelines sentencing regime, the Commission observed
discrepancies between the punishment of white-collar crimes and
40
their blue-collar analogues. Simple theft was punished more harshly
41
than fraud, for example. White-collar criminals were also more
likely to receive probation and, if imprisoned, generally served
shorter sentences than those who committed common law crimes of
42
similar severity. The Commission viewed these discrepancies as
43
unfair. Therefore, rather than codify typical past practice, the
Commission calibrated the Guidelines to produce a “short but
44
definite” period of confinement for white-collar criminals. The
Sentencing Commission believed that this would deter crime better
than a sentencing regime allowing many white-collar criminals to
45
avoid prison time.

37. See id. at 17–18 (“The numbers used and the punishments imposed would come fairly
close to replicating the average pre-Guidelines sentence handed down to particular categories of
criminals.”).
38. See id. at 18 (“[T]he Commission’s ‘past practice’ compromise does not reflect an effort
simply to reconcile two conflicting philosophical positions. It reflects a lack of adequate,
detailed deterrence data, and it reflects the irrational results of any effort to apply ‘just deserts’
principles to detailed behavior through a group process.”).
39. Id. at 20 (noting “the Commission’s decision to increase the severity of punishment for
white-collar crime”).
40. Id.
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 18 (1987).
42. Breyer, supra note 22, at 20.
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Because the 1987 Guidelines sought “short but definite”
46
sentences for white-collar defendants, it is not surprising that they
were very simple. The Guidelines governing fraud, for example, fit on
47
48
a single page. Only six specific offense characteristics could
increase a defendant’s sentence: (1) the amount of the loss caused by
the defendant’s fraud; (2) the degree of planning that the fraud
entailed; (3) the number of victims involved; (4) whether the
defendant falsely claimed to be acting on behalf of a charitable,
religious, or government organization; (5) whether the defendant
violated a judicial or administrative order; and (6) whether the
defendant used foreign bank accounts or transactions to conceal his
49
fraud. Subsequent developments, however, would dramatically
complicate these Guidelines.
B. The Evolution of the Guidelines Governing White-Collar Crime
The Guidelines governing white-collar crime evolved from a
50
concise regime focused on generating “short but definite” prison
sentences to the complicated and severe system of today in three
phases.
First, the Commission began to increase the sentences imposed
for white-collar crimes almost as soon as the Guidelines were
51
enacted. Between 1987 and 1995, the Commission added numerous
additional specific offense characteristics to the Guidelines and
amended the loss tables to subject to greater punishment those who
52
caused their victims more than $40,000 in losses.
The second major development was the Commission’s adoption
of the Economic Crime Package amendments to the Guidelines in

46. Id. (“[T]he Commission believed that a short but definite period of confinement might
deter future crime more effectively than sentences with no confinement condition.”).
47. Frank O. Bowman III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker,
20 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 170 (2008).
48. The term “specific offense characteristics” describes factual circumstances that, if found
to be present by the sentencing judge, can increase or decrease a defendant’s sentence. For a
more detailed discussion, see infra Part II.B.
49. Bowman, supra note 47, at 173 n.47.
50. Breyer, supra note 22, at 22.
51. Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing
Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 387 (2004).
52. Id.
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53

2001. As early as the mid-1990s, the Commission decided that
54
comprehensive reform of the white-collar Guidelines was necessary.
The Justice Department, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, and many federal probation officers believed that sentences
for white-collar defendants convicted of high-loss crimes remained
55
too low. Others, including the defense bar, believed that the
Guidelines were too harsh to defendants convicted of low-dollar
frauds and that judges should be given greater discretion to sentence
56
such offenders to probationary terms. Collaboration among these
groups culminated in the 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments
57
to the Guidelines. These amendments slightly lowered the sentences
of offenders convicted of low-loss frauds and significantly raised the
58
sentences of offenders convicted of high-loss frauds.
The
59
amendments broadened the definition of loss, amended the loss

53. The Economic Crime Package consists of four amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines. First, the guidelines governing theft and fraud were consolidated into a single
guideline. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1, 2F1.1 (2000)
[hereinafter 2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (treating theft and fraud separately) with U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 SENTENCING
GUIDELINES] (presenting a consolidated guideline for economic crimes). Second, the loss table
was modified to provide for lower sentencing ranges for low-value white-collar crimes and to
provide higher sentencing ranges for high-value white-collar crimes. Compare 2000
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, §§ 2B1.1(b)(1), 2F1.1(b)(1), with 2001 SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra, § 2B1.1(b)(1). Third, the Economic Crime Package amendments tweaked
the definition of loss. Compare 2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (defining
loss as the “value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed”), with 2001 SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra, § 2B1.1, cmt. n.2 (defining loss as a “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm
that resulted from the offense”). Finally, the Economic Crime Package amendments tied the
sentencing for money laundering offenses more closely to the underlying crime through which
the laundered funds were obtained. Compare 2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, § 2S1.1
(making money laundering a level twenty-three offense if convicted under 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), or (a)(3)(A), and otherwise a level twenty offense), with 2001
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, § 2S1.1 (making the base offense level for money laundering
the base offense level of the underlying offense). For a full account of the history and
development of the 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments to the Guidelines, see
generally Frank O. Bowman III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An
Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. R. 5 (2001).
54. Bowman, supra note 51, at 387.
55. Id. at 387–88.
56. Id. at 388.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 389.
59. In 2001, the definition of loss under the Guidelines changed from “the value of the
property taken, damaged, or destroyed,” 2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2B1.1
cmt. n.2, to “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense,” 2001
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.2. The 2001 definition is generally
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60

table, and added a special offense characteristic providing for
61
offense-level enhancements based on the number of victims.
62
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 marked the
third and most dramatic stage in the evolution of the Guidelines
governing white-collar crime. Despite the generally positive reception
63
of the 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments, the Sarbanes64
Oxley Act dramatically raised the stakes of white-collar crime.
Congress passed the Act in direct response to a wave of corporate
scandals that began with the collapse of Enron in December 2001 and
continued with breakdowns at WorldCom, Tyco, and Global
65
Crossing. In a speech delivered from Wall Street, President George
W. Bush framed these scandals as the result of the individual
66
defendants’ moral failings and called for stricter criminal laws to
67
enforce higher ethical standards in American boardrooms. The
68
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however flawed, accomplished this aim. In
understood to be significantly broader than the 2000 definition. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note
51, at 389 (observing that through the 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments, the
Commission “redefin[ed] loss in a way that include[d] more kinds of harm in the loss
calculation”).
60. The amendments to the loss table lowered the offense level enhancements for low-loss
economic crimes, but raised the enhancements for high-loss economic crimes. For example, in
2000, a $4,000 fraud would have resulted in a one-level enhancement. 2000 SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2F1.1. In 2001, however, this fraud would merit no loss-related
offense level enhancement. 2001 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2B1.1. Under the
2000 Guidelines, a $100 million fraud would yield an offense level enhancement of eighteen,
2000 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 2F1.1, whereas under the 2001 Guidelines such
a fraud would yield a twenty-six-level enhancement, 2001 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note
53, § 2B1.1.
61. Bowman, supra note 51, at 388–89.
62. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
63. See Bowman, supra note 51, at 394–95 (observing that at a Senate Judiciary Committee
panel on white-collar crime in 2002, “[n]o one argued that penalties for serious economic crimes
were too low under federal law,” and that the Justice Department was generally satisfied with
the 2001 Guidelines amendments).
64. See White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. IX,
§ 905, 116 Stat. 804, 805–06 (directing the Sentencing Commission to reevaluate the efficacy of
the Guidelines governing white-collar crime).
65. Bowman, supra note 51, at 392.
66. Remarks on Corporate Responsibility, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1194, 1195 (July 9, 2002),
available at www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/potus.doc (“We’ve learned of some business
leaders obstructing justice, and misleading clients, falsifying records, business executives
breaching the trust and abusing power.”).
67. Id.
68. Many commentators have criticized the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for being hastily and
sloppily drafted. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 51, at 406 (“[A] number of the specific directives
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addition to raising the statutory maximum sentences for various
69
white-collar crimes, the Act prompted the Sentencing Commission
70
to increase the sentencing ranges for white-collar crimes.
The Commission amended the Guidelines to increase the base
71
offense level of offenders convicted of the most common white72
collar crimes from six to seven. The Commission also provided for
an additional two-level increase to a defendant’s offense level for loss
calculations exceeding $200 million and another two-level increase for
73
loss calculations exceeding $400 million. Finally, the Commission
added variables within the Guidelines to account for the number of
victims the defendant harmed and the defendant’s rank within an
organization. The Commission included a six-level increase for fraud
offenses involving more than 250 victims and an additional four-level

[of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] reflect a striking unfamiliarity with, or indifference to, existing
federal sentencing law and experience . . . .”); George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp
and Other High Crimes: Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (2007) (“The testimony during this session, convened to give due
consideration to [the Sarbanes-Oxley bill], was interrupted so that the members could go to the
Senate floor and vote on the very legislation under consideration.”).
69. Peter J. Henning, The Changing Atmospherics of Corporate Crime Sentencing in the
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act Era, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 243, 246 (2008). Changes in the statutory
maximum are largely superficial, however, as the Guidelines calculations are usually far less
than these statutory maximums. Id.
70. Specifically, the Act directed the Commission to “ensure that the sentencing guidelines
and policy statements reflect the serious nature of the offenses and the penalties set forth in
[the] Act, the growing incidence of serious fraud offenses . . . and the need to modify the
sentencing guidelines and policy statements to deter, prevent, and punish such offenses.” WhiteCollar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. IX, § 905(b)(1), 116
Stat. 804, 805. Further, the Act directed the Commission to consider “whether the guideline
offense levels and enhancements for violations of the sections amended by this Act are
sufficient to deter and punish such offenses, and specifically, are adequate in view of the
statutory increases in penalties contained in [the] Act.” Id. § 905(b)(2), 116 Stat. at 805.
71. The Guidelines’ sentence recommendation is based on a defendant’s “offense level,”
which is the sum of a defendant’s “base offense level” and any offense level adjustment
resulting from the defendant’s “specific offense characteristics.” A defendant’s “base offense
level” is dictated by the crime of which he is convicted. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
72. See Henning, supra note 69, at 248 (“The Sentencing Commission’s first step . . . was to
increase the base offense level for a fraud offense if the crime was punishable by a term of
imprisonment of twenty years or more.”). After Sarbanes-Oxley, mail fraud, wire fraud, and
securities fraud all carry statutory maximum penalties of twenty years. Id. at 246 (citing 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006) and 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006)).
73. Id. at 248 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)
(2003)).
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enhancement for defendants convicted of securities fraud who served
74
as officers or directors of a publicly traded company.
This history reveals the unique nature of the Guidelines
governing white-collar crime. Although the majority of the
Guidelines were calibrated according to the typical past practice of
sentencing judges, those that governed white-collar crime resulted
from the Commission’s policy choices and subsequent congressional
prodding, fueled by a belief that more severe sentences were
necessary to deter white-collar crime and to achieve justice in white75
collar criminal cases.
II. THE CURRENT SENTENCING REGIME IN WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINAL CASES
Under the current sentencing regime in white-collar cases, the
key determinant of a white-collar criminal defendant’s sentence is the
76
amount of the loss attributed to that defendant. The Guidelines
77
place incredible emphasis on this so-called loss calculation.
Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Booker
rendered the Guidelines advisory, the Guidelines continue to drive
78
the sentencing process.
Section A of this Part explores the current status of the
Guidelines. It concludes that despite Booker’s reduction of the
Guidelines’ formal authority, sentencing judges still follow the
Guidelines’ recommendations with roughly the same frequency as
they did before Booker. Section B of this Part explores the Guidelines
governing white-collar crime, concluding that the single most
important factor in determining a defendant’s sentence is the amount
of loss a judge finds the defendant to have caused.

74. Id. at 248–49 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2B1.1(b)(14)(A)).
75. See Podgor, supra note 17 (observing that legislation increasing the penalty for whitecollar crimes “was an outgrowth of the public outcry for retribution for criminal conduct”).
76. See Isaac M. Gradman, Hot Under the White Collar: What the Rollercoaster in
Sentencing Law from Blakely to Booker Will Mean to Corporate Offenders, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 731, 744 (2005) (observing that in sentencing white-collar criminals, loss is “often the most
important determinant of the length of sentence”).
77. Id.
78. See infra Part II.B.
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A. The Sentencing Guidelines’ Continued Impact on the Sentencing
Process
1. The Formal Status of the Guidelines. As a formal matter, the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines carry significantly less weight today than
they did at their inception. The Supreme Court’s decision in Booker
significantly reduced the formal weight of the Guidelines. In Booker,
the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines violate the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee to a jury trial and struck down the statutory
79
provision that made the Guidelines mandatory. Subsequent cases
80
uphold this shift. In Rita v. United States, the Court observed that it
81
is now 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and not the Guidelines, that guides a
82
83
judge’s hand in sentencing. Additionally, in Gall v. United States,
the Court observed that the Guidelines are only one of many factors a
84
district court must consider when imposing a sentence.
Section 3553(a) was part of the original Comprehensive Crime
85
Control Act that created the Guidelines system and sets forth factors
a court must consider in imposing a sentence. The statute demands
that courts impose a “sentence sufficient, but not greater than
86
necessary” to achieve the following aims: (1) reflect the seriousness
87
88
of a defendant’s offense; (2) promote respect for the law; (3)
89
provide just punishment for the offense; (4) afford adequate
90
deterrence to criminal conduct; (5) protect the public from further

79. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
80. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
82. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463 (observing that when assessing a sentence’s reasonableness,
the dominant inquiry is the degree to which that sentence fulfills the objectives Congress set
forth in § 3553(a)). But see Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peiken, Evolving Roles in Federal
Sentencing: The Post-Booker/Fanfan World, FED. CTS. L. REV., Sept. 2005, at para. III.21,
available at http://fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2005/fedctslrev9.shtml (stating that Booker “permits”
courts to consider statutory concerns such as the § 3553(a) factors).
83. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
84. Id. at 602.
85. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, §§ 217–37, 98
Stat. 1837, 2017–34 (creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission); id. § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 1987–
2010 (codifying the purposes of sentencing).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
87. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
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crimes of the defendant; and (6) provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
92
treatment in the most effective manner. In devising a sentence that
achieves these aims, courts should consider the circumstances of the
93
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the
94
kinds of sentences available.
In subsequent cases reaffirming and clarifying its Booker
holding, the Supreme Court has continually emphasized the
responsibility of a sentencing court to consider the individual factual
95
circumstances of every defendant before it. In devising a sentence,
judges are to “make an individualized assessment based on the facts
96
presented,” and may not presume that a sentence is reasonable
97
merely because it falls within the Guidelines range.
Despite this reduction in formal authority, the Guidelines remain
extremely influential at sentencing in that they are the starting point
of any sentence determination. As the Supreme Court outlined in
Gall and Rita, a district court begins a sentencing proceeding by
98
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. Next, both
parties are afforded an opportunity to argue for the imposition of a
sentence that they believe to be appropriate under the circumstances,
which the sentencing judge must consider in light of the § 3553(a)
99
factors. If a judge ultimately decides to impose a sentence outside
the Guidelines range, the judge must consider the extent of this
deviation and ensure that there is a sufficiently compelling
100
justification to support the degree of variance. A judge must explain
a sentence that departs from the applicable Guidelines range in order

91. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
92. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
93. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
94. Id. § 3553(a)(3).
95. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 598 (2007) (“It has been uniform and
constant . . . for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and
every case as a unique study . . . .” (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996))).
96. Id. at 597.
97. Id. at 596–97.
98. Id. at 598; Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007).
99. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 598.
100. Id. This consideration of the degree of variance between the Guidelines sentence and
the actual sentence imposed, however, cannot take the form of an “exceptional circumstances”
requirement or a rigid mathematical formula. Id. at 596. Such inflexible approaches, when
enforced at the appellate level, are inconsistent with the abuse-of-discretion standard of review
that governs sentencing proceedings. Id.
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to allow meaningful appellate review and promote the perception of
101
fair sentencing.
The Guidelines remain influential due to a widely held
assumption that they reflect a “rough approximation” of sentences
102
that comport with the aims Congress set forth in § 3553(a). From its
creation, the Commission has been charged with realizing the
103
purposes of sentencing espoused in § 3553(a). In Rita, the Supreme
Court characterized sentencing judges and the Sentencing
Commission as conducting essentially the same § 3553(a) analysis,
104
“the [former], at retail, [and] the other at wholesale.”
2. The Guidelines’ Continued Practical Impact. Evidence of the
persistent relevance of the Guidelines calculus can be readily
observed. In its Final Report on the Impact of United States v. Booker
on Federal Sentencing, the Commission concluded that in 2006, a
supermajority—85.9 percent—of federal sentences conformed to the
105
Guidelines. The Commission found that the severity of sentences
106
did not substantially change after Booker.
This continued adherence to the Guidelines has not changed
since the Supreme Court clarified its Booker holding through its
subsequent opinions in Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough. Since the Gall and
107
Kimbrough decisions in December 2007, the frequency with which
district courts have imposed sentences within the Guidelines range
has dropped a mere percentage point, from 60.8 percent to 59.8
108
percent. Of these non-Guidelines sentences, the vast majority are

101. Id. at 597.
102. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464–65 (“[I]t is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as
practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s
objectives.”).
103. Id. at 2463; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that one of the Sentencing
Commission’s objectives is to carry out the purposes of sentencing espoused in § 3553(a)).
104. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463.
105. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 41, at 46.
106. Id. Although the report provides no breakdown of sentencing practices in white-collar
criminal cases specifically, commentators have observed that sentencing in white-collar criminal
cases remains tied to the Guidelines calculations. See, e.g., Podgor, supra note 17, at 732
(“Although the sentencing guidelines have some flexibility resulting from the recent Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Booker, the culture of mandated guidelines still permeates the
structure, and, as such, prominently advises the judiciary.” (footnotes omitted)).
107. The Supreme Court decided Rita in February 2007, one term prior to its decisions in
Gall and Kimbrough.
108. NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 240 (4th ed. Supp. 2008).
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attributable to downward departures sought by the government.
Since Gall and Kimbrough, the percentage of sentences outside the
Guidelines range that are not attributable to government-sponsored
departures increased by only 1.4 points, from 12.0 percent before Gall
110
and Kimbrough to 13.4 percent after.
This data suggests that although Booker and its progeny
dramatically changed the formal relationship of the Sentencing
Guidelines to the sentencing process, as a practical matter the
Guidelines calculations remain the key determinant of a defendant’s
111
sentence.
B. The Loss Calculation’s Dominant Role at the Sentencing of WhiteCollar Criminal Defendants
In the context of white-collar crime, the loss calculation remains
112
a “critical determinant” of a defendant’s sentence and is often the
“the single most important factor in the application of the Sentencing
113
Guidelines.”
1. The Context of the Loss Calculation Within the Guidelines.
The calculation of a defendant’s sentence under the Guidelines is
114
based on that defendant’s offense level. For most white-collar
crimes, this determination begins with a base offense level of either
six or seven, depending on whether the offense of which the

109. Id. In the year before the Gall and Kimbrough decisions, 25.6 percent of sentences
incorporated a government-sponsored departure from the Guidelines range, compared to 12
percent of sentences that incorporated a variance from the Guidelines range that was not
sponsored by the government. In the nearly five months following Gall and Kimbrough for
which data is available, 25.2 percent of sentences were the result of a government-sponsored
departure, whereas 13.4 percent of sentences incorporated a variance that was not sponsored by
the government. Id.
110. Id.
111. Indeed, several commentators have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., id. at 242 (“[This
data] does not support the fear that the sky would fall after Gall and Kimbrough.”); Podgor,
supra note 17, at 732 (“Although the sentencing guidelines have some flexibility resulting from
the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, the culture of mandated
guidelines still permeates the structure, and, as such, prominently advises the judiciary.”
(footnotes omitted)).
112. United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007).
113. See Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime Sentences After Booker: Was the Sentencing
of Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 757, 767 (2006) (observing that the loss
calculation was the most important factor in the sentencing of WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers).
114. See 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, ch. 5, pt. A (showing a list of
offense levels and the sentence ranges to which they correspond).
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defendant was convicted entails a statutory maximum term of
115
imprisonment of twenty years or more. The sentencing court then
adds additional levels based on the specific offense characteristics of
116
the defendant’s case. The loss calculation is the most important of
117
these specific offense characteristics.
In applying the loss calculation, sentencing courts first must
118
determine whether the intended or actual loss is greater. If this
figure is above $5,000, then additions are made to the defendant’s
offense level in accordance with the table found in Section
119
2B1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines Manual, which is reproduced here:
Table 1. The Loss Calculation
Loss (Apply the Greatest)

Increase in Level

$5,000 or less

No increase

More than $5,000

Add 2

More than $10,000

Add 4

More than $30,000

Add 6

More than $70,000

Add 8

More than $120,000

Add 10

More than $200,000

Add 12

More than $400,000

Add 14

More than $1,000,000

Add 16

More than $2,500,000

Add 18

More than $7,000,000

Add 20

More than $20,000,000

Add 22

More than $50,000,000

Add 24

More than $100,000,000

Add 26

More than $200,000,000

Add 28

More than $400,000,000

Add 30

As this table from Section 2B1.1(b)(1) indicates, the loss
calculation can add up to thirty levels to a defendant’s offense level,
which can account for up to a 262-month increase in the length of a
defendant’s recommended sentence, even in the absence of any other

115. Id. § 2B1.1(a).
116. Id. § 2B1.1(b).
117. See supra note 76.
118. See 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (“[L]oss is the
greater of actual loss or intended loss.”).
119. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
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120

sentence enhancing characteristics. The loss calculation alone can
121
transform a sentence from “modest to substantial.”
2. Calculating Loss.
Despite the importance of the loss
122
calculation in determining a defendant’s sentence, neither Congress
nor the Sentencing Commission has offered courts any real guidance
123
on how to calculate this figure. The commentary to the Guidelines
defines loss circularly as “the greater of actual loss or intended
124
loss.” It further defines actual loss as the reasonably foreseeable
harm that resulted from the offense, when that harm is measurable in
125
terms of money. The Guidelines commentary defines intended loss
as the monetary harm that the defendant intended to result from the
126
offense. The Guidelines further instruct courts that in determining
these figures, they are to take into account factors such as the “fair
market value of the property unlawfully taken, copied, or
127
destroyed,” “[t]he approximate number of victims multiplied by the
128
average loss to each victim,” and “[t]he reduction that resulted from
the offense in the value of equity securities or other corporate
129
assets.” These definitions and factors are unhelpful and circular,
however, because they assume the definition of loss and ignore
thorny causation issues inherent in phrases such as “the property
unlawfully taken, copied, or destroyed” and “the reduction that
130
resulted from the offense.”

120. See id. ch. 5, pt. A (showing that the Guidelines recommend a sentence of between zero
and six months for a defendant with no prior criminal history and an offense level of seven, and
that the Guidelines recommend a sentence of between 210 and 262 months for a defendant with
no prior criminal history and an offense level of thirty-seven).
121. Podgor, supra note 17, at 754 (quoting Henning, supra note 113, at 767).
122. See supra Part I.B.2.
123. See Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1628 (2007) (“Congress and the Sentencing Commission have been no
help to courts faced with the task of determining loss in cases of financial reporting fraud.”).
124. 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3.
125. Id.
126. Id. In most cases involving public companies, actual loss is likely to control at
sentencing due to the difficulty in identifying the loss “intended” by a corporate executive who
manipulated the corporation for disparate ends such as prestige, job security, and personal
portfolio gains. Buell, supra note 123, at 1620.
127. 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also Buell, supra note 123, at 1626 (observing that in accounting fraud cases,
“the issues of loss amount and causation get thorny”).

VOLLRATH IN FINAL 2.DOC

2010]

LOSING THE LOSS CALCULATION

1/5/2010 2:42:40 AM

1019

Although determining the loss a defendant caused may be
131
straightforward in a simple fraud case, the issue becomes clouded in
more typical white-collar cases involving a publicly traded company.
In such a scenario, multiple victims trade multiple securities over
many months during the perpetration of a fraud. During this period,
those securities may change hands several times and fluctuate in value
for any number of reasons. The loss calculation therefore becomes
132
extremely difficult. Although the Guidelines require sentencing
133
courts to make only a “reasonable estimate of the loss,” several
appellate courts have confirmed that this analysis is nonetheless
134
135
complex. In United States v. Olis, for example, the Fifth Circuit
applied the principles of loss causation used in civil securities fraud
136
137
cases to the criminal context. The court held that for a loss
calculation in a securities fraud case to be reasonable, a sentencing
court must determine the amount of the decline in the corporation’s
138
share price attributable to the defendant’s participation in the fraud.

131. See Buell, supra note 123, at 1625–26 (observing that when a con man convinces an
elderly woman that a $100,000 antique dresser is worth only $500, and purchases it for that
amount, the victim’s loss is $99,500).
132. See United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Determining the
extent to which a defendant’s fraud . . . caused shareholders’ losses inevitably cannot be an exact
science.”); United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 127 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Determining this [loss]
amount is no easy task.”).
133. 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Olis (Olis I), 429 F.3d 540, 546–47 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting an
oversimplified “market capitalization” approach to the loss calculation whereby the sentencing
court based loss on “a gross correlation between stock price decline and the revelation of a
fraudulent transaction”); see also Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 180 (“The District Court’s basic failure
at least to approximate the amount of the loss caused by the fraud without even considering
other factors relevant to a decline in [the company’s] share price requires a remand to
redetermine the amount of the loss . . . .”).
135. United States v. Olis (Olis I), 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005).
136. In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), the Supreme Court held
that basic proximate cause principles apply to securities fraud in the same manner that they
apply to common law fraud. See id. at 338 (observing that “[a] private plaintiff who claims
securities fraud must prove that the defendant’s fraud caused an economic loss”). In so holding,
the Court rejected the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ position that merely pleading that a fraud
inflated a stock’s purchase price suffices to state a claim. David H. Angeli & Per A. Ramfjord,
Reexamining ‘Loss’ and ‘Gain’ in the Wake of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo—New
Ammunition for Securities Fraud Defendants, 30 CHAMPION 10, 10 n.8 (2006).
137. Olis I, 429 F.3d at 546.
138. See id. (“Where the value of a security declines for other reasons, however, such
decline, or component of the decline, is not a ‘loss’ attributable to the misrepresentation.”).
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The Second Circuit reached this same conclusion in United States v.
139
140
Rutkoske, as did the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Zolp.
Because few district court judges have the necessary training to
engage in the intensive economic analysis that Olis, Zolp, and
Rutkoske required, the loss calculation in most cases becomes a battle
141
of expert witnesses. In this process, the expert witnesses for the
prosecution and the defense invariably arrive at widely divergent
142
estimates of the loss the defendant caused and the judge is left to
143
decide which expert is more persuasive. Faced with this challenge,
at least one court has simply given up, deciding that the amount of
144
loss could not be determined in the case before it.
III. THE NEED TO REFORM THE CURRENT SENTENCING REGIME
GOVERNING WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL CASES
The sentencing of federal white-collar criminal defendants is
deeply flawed. The Guidelines recommend sentences that are
generally too harsh. Moreover, the Guidelines place undue emphasis
on the loss calculation, an imprecise measure that fails to accurately
correlate with a defendant’s culpability.

139. See United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[L]osses from causes
other than the fraud must be excluded from the loss calculation.” (quoting United States v.
Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006))).
140. See United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he court must
disentangle the underlying value of the stock, inflation of that value due to the fraud, and either
inflation or deflation of that value due to unrelated causes.”).
141. Examples of such battles abound in white-collar fraud cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449–50 (D. Conn. 2008); United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp.
2d 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Brown, 338 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558 (M.D. Pa. 2004);
United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1239 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
142. Buell, supra note 123, at 1632; see also, e.g., Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 449–50 (“[The
government’s expert] opined that his best estimate of the . . . loss was between $1.2 billion and
$1.4 billion,” whereas the defense expert concluded that “the amount of loss due to the . . . fraud
that can actually be calculated is zero.”).
143. Buell, supra note 123, at 1632.
144. Id. at 1633–34; see also United States v. Olis (Olis II), No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL
2716048, at *8–9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006) (“[T]he court is compelled to conclude that the
confounding announcements and the unprovable assumptions on which [the government’s
expert] necessarily relied in reaching his estimate of actual loss demonstrate that it is not
possible to estimate with any degree of reasonable certainty the actual loss to shareholders
caused by [the disclosure of the defendant’s fraudulent actions].”).
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A. The Severity of the Guidelines Governing White-Collar Crime
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001, the Guidelines have
recommended excessively high sentences for white-collar crimes. The
recommended sentences for high-loss white-collar crimes eclipse the
145
and serial child
sentences typically imposed for murder
146
molestation. In some cases, the recommendations are so high that
147
they are “literally[,] off the chart.”
148
United States v. Adelson aptly illustrates this phenomenon. This
case concerned Richard Adelson, the president of Impath, a publicly
149
traded company. From 2001 to 2003, Adelson participated in a
conspiracy to commit securities fraud and filed several false reports
150
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Impath’s behalf.
But Adelson was a latecomer to the conspiracy, which various Impath
accounting executives had concocted earlier in response to pressure
151
from the corporation’s CEO. Moreover, Adelson was motivated not
by greed, but rather by fear. Judge Rakoff found that “Adelson was
sucked into the fraud not because he sought to inflate the company’s
earnings, but because, as President of the company, he feared the
effects of exposing what he had belatedly learned was the substantial
152
fraud perpetrated by others.”
Nevertheless, the Guidelines
calculations imposed upon Adelson an offense level of forty-six, three
levels higher than that needed to yield a recommendation of life in

145. See Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (“[A]n Offense Level of 55 is a level normally only
seen in cases involving major international narcotics traffickers, Mafia dons, and the like.”); see
also, e.g., United States v. Masferrer, 514 F.3d 1158, 1163 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding a
Guidelines sentence of thirty years in prison); Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (observing that
the Guidelines recommend life imprisonment). The average murderer is sentenced to less than
nineteen years in prison. Bowman, supra note 47, at 169 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 256 (2006)).
146. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Twenty-five years is a
long sentence for a white collar crime, longer than the sentences routinely imposed by many
states for violent crimes, including murder, or other serious crimes such as serial child
molestation.”).
147. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 509; see also Bowman, supra note 47, at 168 (observing that
the Guidelines “generat[e] sentencing ranges for [white-collar] property crimes from 5 to 14
notches higher than necessary for life imprisonment”).
148. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). For additional details
regarding this case, see supra Introduction.
149. Id. at 507.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 513.
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153

prison. Recognizing the excessive nature of this sentence, Judge
154
Rakoff refused to apply it. In his sentencing memorandum, the
judge did not mince words, describing the Guidelines’
155
recommendation as “barbari[c],” and “patently absurd on [its]
156
face.”
Adelson’s case is not unique. Several commentators have
expressed frustration with the severity of the current Guidelines.
Professor Bowman, for example, has observed that “under the
current Guidelines a corporate officer who presides over a fraud
involving securities and a loss of only $2.5 million can qualify for life
157
158
imprisonment.” In United States v. Parris, Judge Block lamented
that the Guidelines effectively recommend life imprisonment when an
officer or director of virtually any public corporation is found guilty
159
of securities fraud.
In addition to far exceeding the severity necessary to achieve
retributive justice, the Guidelines are much more severe than
necessary to effectively deter white-collar crime. Short but certain
prison terms provide substantial deterrence for would-be white-collar
160
criminals.

153. Id. at 511 (determining Adelson’s offense level to be forty-six, and observing that “the
guidelines recommend life imprisonment for every offense level over 42”).
154. See id. at 507 (“In the end, however, the Court imposed a non-guideline sentence of 42
months imprisonment . . . .”); id. at 512 (“[T]he Court, confronted with an absurd guideline
result . . . chose to focus its primary attention on the non-guidelines factors set forth in
§ 3553(a) . . . .”).
155. Id. at 511.
156. Id. at 515.
157. Bowman, supra note 47, at 168 & n.20.
158. United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
159. See id. at 754 (“[W]e now have an advisory guidelines regime where . . . any officer or
director of virtually any public corporation who has committed securities fraud will be
confronted with a guidelines calculation either calling for or approaching lifetime
imprisonment.”). Judge Lake expressed a similar sentiment in United States v. Olis (Olis II), No.
H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006). In that case—decided prior to the
Supreme Court’s Booker decision—Judge Lake had been forced to impose a Guidelines
sentence of 292 months. Id. at *1. Reconsidering the sentence following Booker, Judge Lake
recognized the inappropriate severity of the Guidelines calculation. See id. at *13 (“[T]he court
concludes that a sentence within the applicable guideline range would not be reasonable . . . .”).
Judge Lake therefore deviated from the Guidelines and imposed a sentence of only seventy-two
months. Id.
160. Members of the Sentencing Commission believed that “short but definite” sentences
for white-collar criminals would have high deterrent value. Breyer, supra note 22, at 22; see also
Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (drawing support for the deterrent value of short but definite
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B. The Guidelines’ Destructive Focus on Loss
In addition to recommending sentences that are generally too
high, the Guidelines attach undue weight to the amount of the loss a
defendant causes. The loss calculation is imprecise and correlates
poorly with a defendant’s real culpability.
1. The Loss Calculation’s Imprecision. Neither Congress nor the
Sentencing Commission has offered sentencing courts any real
161
guidance on performing the loss calculation. This lack of guidance,
combined with the inherent complexity of the calculation, means the
loss figure often seems arbitrary. It is usually based on the
formulations of expert witnesses, and defense and government
162
experts invariably reach widely divergent figures. Even a single
expert can produce a wide range of loss figures, depending on the
163
assumptions the expert includes in the model. In United States v.
164
Ferguson, for example, the government’s expert witness produced
several estimates of the loss, ranging from $344 million to $1.4
165
billion. When the loss a defendant causes is so abstract that not even
a court-recognized expert can quantify it with any precision, the
figure says little about the moral blameworthiness of a defendant’s
conduct.
2. The Loss Calculation’s Weak Correlation to a Defendant’s
Culpability. Even if the loss a defendant caused could be precisely
and reliably determined, it would still only poorly approximate a
defendant’s culpability. The Guidelines’ emphasis on the loss
calculation obscures other important indicia of culpability, such as the
defendant’s position within the company, the extent of the
defendant’s involvement in the criminal conduct, and the profit that

prison sentences from Richard Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 80 (2005), and
Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 492 (1998)).
161. See supra Part II.B.2.
162. See supra Part II.B.2.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449–50 (D. Conn. 2008)
(discussing how different studies used by the government’s expert witness to estimate loss
produced a wide range of loss figures).
164. United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008).
165. See id. at 449 (“The Government’s expert . . . opined that his best estimate of
the . . . loss was between $1.2 billion and $1.4 billion, though he also provided several other loss
calculations ranging from $344 million to $598 million.”).
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the defendant obtained by participating in the fraud. To more
clearly illustrate the shortcomings of the Guidelines’ focus on the loss
calculation, consider the following two hypothetical white-collar
criminals.
First, consider John, an accounting executive at a publicly traded
corporation. The company’s $1 billion worth of stock is held by
thousands of people. In the course of his ordinary employment duties,
John becomes aware of an ongoing conspiracy to fraudulently inflate
the company’s earnings. Because of the nature of John’s employment,
he must either approve these inflated figures and join the conspiracy
or report the fraud. He fears that, should he report the fraud, he will
lose his job in the aftermath. He expects the corporation’s share price
to plummet in response to the amended financial statements and its
capital to dry up as investors and would-be creditors lose confidence
in the firm’s management. John therefore joins the conspiracy. John is
not a conspiracy leader, and at no point does he derive any personal
benefit from the fraud beyond that incidental to the inflated health of
the firm. When the fraud is later discovered, John is convicted. The
167
court can precisely determine that the fraud caused a 10 percent
drop in the company’s share price, producing a loss of $101 million.
Next, consider Robert, the president of an investment firm with
three employees. Robert solicits and obtains contributions from 250
wealthy individuals, totaling $101 million. Instead of investing this
money, Robert engages in a classic Ponzi scheme. He misappropriates
the funds for his own personal consumption and, to discourage his
investors from withdrawing their money, falsely reports astronomical
returns. The fraud is eventually discovered, but not before the money
is spent and the fund is worthless. The court finds that Robert has
caused a loss of $101 million, the value of the misappropriated funds.
Although John and Robert behaved very differently, the
168
Sentencing Guidelines fail to reflect this fact. Both John and Robert

166. See Podgor, supra note 17, at 756–57 (“Courts seldom consider where the individual
may be on the corporate ladder, the extent to which he or she is directly engaged in the criminal
conduct, and any individual profit obtained as a result of engaging in the improper activity.”
(citations omitted)).
167. This is rarely possible in reality. See supra Part III.B.1.
168. John’s total offense level would be between forty-seven and forty-nine, depending on
whether the sentencing judge found him to be a minor participant in the fraud. John would
begin with an offense level of seven, 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 2B1.1(a),
and would be subject to the following offense level increases: (1) twenty-six levels for the $100
million dollar loss, id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(N); (2) six levels for committing a fraud that involved more
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169

begin with the same offense level. They also receive the same
offense-level enhancements for the amount of loss they caused and
the number of victims they harmed as well as for jeopardizing the
health of their respective firms, violating securities laws while holding
170
their respective positions, and abusing positions of trust. Although
the Guidelines consider John and Robert’s respective roles in the
fraud, the effect of considering this factor is minute, accounting for a
171
difference of between two and four offense levels. By comparison,
172
the loss calculation accounts for a twenty-six offense level increase.
Moreover, the difference between John and Robert’s respective roles
has no practical effect given the extreme nature of the Guidelines’
recommendations. After either defendant has exceeded a total
offense level of forty-two, the Guidelines recommend the maximum
statutorily permissible sentence; it makes no difference whether a
defendant’s offense level is a forty-seven or a fifty-one.
The Guidelines fail to achieve justice in white-collar criminal
cases. Their sentencing recommendations are irrationally high and,
due to the Guidelines’ overemphasis on the loss calculation, fail to
accurately reflect a defendant’s culpability.
IV. KIMBROUGH V. UNITED STATES AS AN AVENUE FOR REFORM
With its opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme
Court has opened the door to systemic change in the way white-collar
criminals are sentenced. In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court upheld a
than 249 victims, id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C); (3) four levels for jeopardizing the financial security of a
publicly traded company or financial institution, id. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(A)–(C); (4) four levels for
violating securities law while an officer of a publicly traded company or an investment advisor,
id. § 2B1.1(b)(17)(A); and (5) two levels for abusing a position of trust or using a special skill to
facilitate or conceal the offense, id. § 3B1.3. John’s offense level might be reduced by two if the
sentencing judge found him to be only a minor participant in the fraud. Id. § 3B1.2(b). Robert’s
offense level would be fifty-one. Robert would also begin with an offense level of seven, id. §
2B1.1(a), and would be subject to the same offense level enhancements as John, id. §§
2B1.1(b)(1)(N), 2B1.1(b)(2)(C), 2B1.1(b)(14)(A)–(C), 2B1.1(b)(17)(A), 3B1.3. Robert would
not be eligible for the two-level reduction for minor involvement in the offense, id. § 3B1.2(b),
and would instead be subject to an additional two-level increase for his leadership role, id. §
3B1.1(c). The Guidelines recommend a life sentence for all offense levels over forty-two. Id. ch.,
5 pt. A.
169. See supra note 168.
170. See supra note 168.
171. John might be eligible for a two-level reduction to his offense level for his minor role in
the fraud, 2009 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 3B1.2(b), and Robert would be
subject to a two-level increase for his leadership role, id. § 3B1.1(c).
172. See supra note 168.
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deviation from the Guidelines governing crack cocaine offenses based
on a sentencing judge’s policy disagreement with those Guidelines’
173
recommendations. If this policy discretion were extended to the
sentencing of white-collar criminals, sentencing judges could
disregard the strictures of the loss calculation and restore rationality
to the sentencing of white-collar criminal defendants.
The Kimbrough opinion is subject to two possible
interpretations. Kimbrough can be read broadly to allow judges
unfettered discretion to deviate from any guideline based on the
174
judge’s policy disagreement with that guideline. Language in the
Kimbrough opinion, however, suggests that the Court’s holding may
be limited in two significant ways. First, some language in the opinion
suggests that policy-based discretion may be applicable only to a
narrower class of guidelines: those that—like the Guidelines
governing crack cocaine offenses—were not calibrated as a result of
the Sentencing Commission’s reasoned assessment of empirical data
175
and national experience. Second, the Court’s opinion raises the
possibility that policy-based discretion is not appropriate when
176
guidelines result from an explicit congressional directive.
Despite these potential limitations, sentencing courts can and
should use Kimbrough to restore rationality to the sentencing of
white-collar criminals by recognizing the loss calculation as bad policy
and declining to impose the sentences it recommends. This course is
possible under the broader reading of the Court’s Kimbrough
holding. This Part will argue, however, that even under a narrow
interpretation of Kimbrough, the opinion grants sentencing courts
discretion to deviate from the Guidelines’ recommendations in whitecollar criminal cases based purely upon the judge’s policy
177
disagreement with the loss calculation.

173. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007) (“The question here
presented is whether, as the Court of Appeals held in this case, ‘a sentence . . . outside the
guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the sentencing
disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses.’ We hold that, under Booker, the cocaine
Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only, and that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding the crack/powder disparity effectively mandatory.” (citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. Kimbrough, 174 Fed. App’x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam))).
174. See infra Part IV.A.
175. See infra Part IV.B.1.
176. See infra Part IV.B.2.
177. See infra Part IV.C.
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This Part will proceed in three steps. First, this Part will describe
178
the Kimbrough holding at its most broad level. Next, this Part will
discuss the language in Kimbrough that potentially limits the scope of
179
the opinion. Finally, this Part will argue that Kimbrough grants
sentencing judges discretion in white-collar criminal cases even if
180
interpreted narrowly. In making this argument, this Part compares
the Guidelines governing white-collar crime to those governing crack
cocaine offenses and concludes that both sets of Guidelines lack
grounding in the Sentencing Commission’s assessment of empirical
data and national experience. The Part further concludes that neither
the 100-to-1 crack/powder cocaine disparity nor the Guidelines’
emphasis on the loss calculation was incorporated as the result of a
181
congressional directive.
A. The Supreme Court’s Kimbrough Holding at Its Broadest
Read broadly, Kimbrough v. United States stands for the
proposition that a sentencing judge may apply a sentence outside a
guideline’s recommended range based purely on a policy
182
disagreement with that guideline’s calculation.
In Kimbrough, a district court judge imposed a sentence for
183
possession of crack cocaine that was far below the recommended
184
Guidelines range. The district court considered the defendant’s
individual “history and characteristics,” but the judge’s dominant
rationale for deviating from the Guidelines range was the judge’s
policy disagreement with what he considered to be the
“disproportionate and unjust effect” of the Guidelines’ disparate
185
treatment of crack and powder cocaine at sentencing. Specifically,
the judge disagreed with the Guidelines’ treatment of the possession
of crack cocaine as tantamount to the possession of one hundred

178. See infra Part IV.A.
179. See infra Part IV.B.
180. See infra Part IV.C.
181. See infra Part IV.C.
182. See supra note 173.
183. Specifically, Kimbrough pleaded guilty to four offenses: conspiracy to distribute crack
and powder cocaine, possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine,
possession with intent to distribute powder cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking offense. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007).
184. See id. at 565 (observing that the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 180 months
when the Guidelines called for a sentence of 228 to 270 months).
185. Id.
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186

times that much powder cocaine. The district court held that this
treatment yielded a sentence greater than necessary to achieve the
187
purposes of sentencing outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
In its Kimbrough opinion, the Supreme Court approved the
district court’s use of discretion on these grounds, holding that a
sentence based on such policy disagreement was entitled to the same
188
reasonableness review as any other. According to the Supreme
Court, “[t]he ultimate question in Kimbrough’s case [was] ‘whether
the sentence was reasonable—i.e., whether the District Judge abused
189
his discretion’” in applying a sentence he thought just. In reaching
this decision, the Supreme Court abrogated contrary holdings in the
190
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.
Indeed, some appellate courts have already hinted at adopting
191
this broad reading. The Fifth Circuit has gone so far as to state that
“Kimbrough does not limit the relevance of a district court’s policy
disagreement with the Guidelines to the situations such as the cocaine
192
disparity and whatever might be considered similar.”

186. See id. (“The [district] court also commented that the case exemplified the
‘disproportionate and unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing.’”); id. at
566 (“Although chemically similar, crack and powder cocaine are handled very differently for
sentencing purposes. The 100-to-1 ratio yields sentences for crack offenses three to six times
longer than those for powder offenses involving equal amounts of drugs.”).
187. Id. at 565.
188. See id. at 576 (“The ultimate question in Kimbrough’s case is ‘whether the sentence was
reasonable—i.e., whether the District Judge abused his discretion . . . .’”).
189. Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007)).
190. See United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that courts may
not impose a sentence outside of the Guidelines range because of a disagreement with the
sentencing ratio); United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 357–58 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a
court could not reject the Guidelines sentencing ratio on purely policy-based reasons); United
States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1368–69 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court’s
disagreement with the policy of employing the crack-to-powder cocaine ratio was not a
permissible sentencing factor); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 636 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
that variance from the Guidelines cannot be based solely on the court’s disagreement with the
sentencing ratio); United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 64–65 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that a district
court could not impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range based on its rejection of the
100-to-1 crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing ratio).
191. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After
Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 14–15), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433581 (observing that the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have
issued opinions expressing skepticism of the potential limitations alluded to in the Supreme
Court’s Kimbrough opinion). Professor Hessick cites United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 173
(2d Cir. 2008), United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 165 (4th Cir. 2008), and United States v.
Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2009) in support of this proposition. Id. at 15 nn.92–94.
192. Hessick, supra note 191, at 15 (quoting Simmons, 568 F.3d at 569).
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B. A Narrower Interpretation of Kimbrough
Although it is evident that Kimbrough struck a strong blow in
193
favor of a judge’s discretion at sentencing, language in Kimbrough
194
suggests that its holding might be limited in two significant ways.
First, the Court indicates that a judge’s discretion to deviate from the
Guidelines for policy reasons might be limited to Guidelines that are
not based upon the Sentencing Commission’s consideration of
195
empirical evidence and past national experience. Second, language
in the Court’s opinion indicates that policy-based deviation from a
guideline’s calculation may be inappropriate when the guideline at
196
issue resulted from an explicit congressional directive.
1. Guidelines Promulgated Pursuant to the Characteristic
Institutional Role of the Sentencing Commission. Language in the
Court’s Kimbrough opinion suggests that a sentencing judge’s policybased discretion might be limited when the guideline at issue results
from the Sentencing Commission’s exercise of its discrete institutional
role. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg took notice of the
characteristic institutional roles played by the Sentencing
Commission and a sentencing judge. The Sentencing Commission,
Ginsburg observed, “has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its
determinations on empirical data and national experience, guided by
197
a professional staff with appropriate expertise.’” A sentencing
court, on the other hand, is better equipped to evaluate the individual
198
circumstances of a particular defendant before it. Justice Ginsburg

193. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that with its
opinions in Gall, Rita, and Kimbrough, the Supreme Court sent a message that “responsibility
for sentencing is placed largely in the precincts of the district courts”).
194. See id. at 192 (“We do not, however, take the Supreme Court’s comments concerning
the scope and nature of ‘closer review’ to be the last word on these questions. More will have to
be fleshed out as issues present themselves.”).
195. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574–75. The opinion observes that the Sentencing
Commission “has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its determinations on empirical data and
national experience,’” id. at 574 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir.
2007) (McConnell, J., concurring)), and that in light of these considerations, “closer review may
be in order” when the Guidelines result from the exercise of this characteristic institutional role,
id. at 575.
196. See id. at 570–71 (observing that the government contends that the Sentencing
Guidelines carry special weight where they result from a congressional policy directive, but
finding that the crack/powder sentencing did not so result).
197. Id. at 574 (quoting Pruitt, 502 F.3d at 1171 (McConnell, J., concurring)).
198. Id.
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suggested that the reasonableness of a district court’s deviation from
the Guidelines range may be evaluated on a sliding scale. A nonGuidelines sentence is more likely to be found reasonable when it is
199
based on the exceptional circumstances of the defendant. When the
defendant’s circumstances are unremarkable and the Guidelines’
recommendation is based on the Commission’s assessment of
empirical data and national experience, Justice Ginsburg writes that a
district court’s deviation from the Guidelines range may be subject to
200
“closer review.”
Justice Ginsburg did not engage this issue in the Court’s
Kimbrough opinion, however. Instead, she found that the sentencing
disparity between crack and powder cocaine was not based on the
Commission’s reasoned assessment of empirical data and past
201
national experience, and therefore the specter of “closer review”
202
did not apply in Kimbrough. Justice Ginsburg observed that
although most of the Guidelines’ recommended sentencing ranges
were calibrated according to the typical past practice of sentencing
203
judges, the sentencing ranges for crack and powder cocaine
possession, at the time of their creation, reflected a then-existing
sentiment that possession of crack was an especially serious drug
204
offense, and resulted from the Commission’s effort to mirror the
205
treatment of crack cocaine under the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act.
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion therefore leaves open the
possibility that a sentencing judge is not entitled to deviate from a

199. See id. at 574–75 (“[A] district court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines
may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case ‘outside the
“heartland” to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply.’” (quoting Rita v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)).
200. See id. at 575 (“[C]loser review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from
the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the Guidelines range ‘fails properly to
reflect § 3553(a) considerations’ . . . .” (quoting Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (2007))).
201. See id. (“The crack cocaine Guidelines, however, present no occasion for elaborative
discussion of this matter because those Guidelines do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise
of its characteristic institutional role.”).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 567.
204. Id.
205. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 1 (1995) (“The current sentencing structure for cocaine offenses
is primarily the result of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.”); see also Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at
567 (“The Commission did not use [an] empirical approach in developing the Guidelines
sentences for drug-trafficking offenses. Instead, it employed the 1986 Act’s weight-driven
scheme.”).
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guideline based on pure policy grounds when that guideline was
formulated pursuant to the Sentencing Commission’s exercise of its
206
characteristic institutional role.
2. Guidelines Promulgated in Response to a Congressional
Directive. Further language in the Court’s Kimbrough opinion
suggests the potential for an additional limitation where a guideline’s
recommendation results from an explicit congressional directive.
In Kimbrough, the government argued that sentencing judges
should not be allowed to substitute their own policy judgment for that
207
of Congress. The government conceded in its brief that sentencing
judges have broad discretion to disagree with the Sentencing
Guidelines’ recommendations on policy grounds in the ordinary
208
case.
The government argued, however, that the sentencing
disparity between crack and powder cocaine presented a special case
because the Sentencing Commission incorporated this feature into
the Guidelines to give effect to congressional policy. The government
thus argued that the Guidelines governing crack cocaine offenses
were entitled to special weight that precluded a sentencing judge from
209
deviating from them based purely on policy grounds.
Although Justice Ginsburg and the Kimbrough majority
dismissed this argument, the Court declined to engage the
government’s underlying contention that a congressional directive
210
can trumps a sentencing court’s policy discretion. Instead, the Court
again sidestepped the issue, finding that the sentencing disparity
between crack and powder cocaine did not result from an explicit
congressional directive and that the government’s contention was
211
therefore irrelevant to Kimbrough’s case.

206. Hessick, supra note 191, 11–12 (“[T]he Court has suggested that the level of appellate
scrutiny for non-Guidelines sentences that are based on policy disagreement may turn on
whether a particular Guideline was derived from ‘empirical data and national experience.’”
(quoting Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575)).
207. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570 (citing Brief for the United States at 25, Kimbrough, 128
S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-6330)).
208. Id. (citing Brief for the United States, supra note 207, at 16.
209. Id. (citing Brief for the United States, supra note 207, at 25).
210. See id. at 571 (finding no “implicit directive” in the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act).
211. Id.
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C. The Case for Deviating from the Guidelines Governing WhiteCollar Crime Even Under a Narrow Interpretation of Kimbrough
Neither of these potential limitations should apply to the
sentencing of white-collar criminals. Like the crack-powder
sentencing disparity, the fraud Guidelines resulted neither from the
Sentencing Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional
role nor from an explicit congressional directive. This Section
examines each of these potential limitations in turn, comparing the
origin of the crack-powder sentencing disparity to that of the
Guidelines governing white-collar crime. This Section concludes that
the rationale employed by the Court in Kimbrough should extend
equally to the Guidelines governing white-collar crime. Kimbrough’s
grant of discretion should apply to the sentencing of white-collar
criminals even in light of these potential limitations.
1. The White-Collar Crime Guidelines and the Commission’s
Characteristic Institutional Role. Like the Guidelines governing crack
212
cocaine offenses, the Guidelines governing white-collar crime did
not result from the Sentencing Commission’s exercise of its
characteristic institutional role. These Guidelilnes were not calibrated
pursuant to the Commission’s assessment of empirical data and
national experience. Instead, they resulted from a combination of the
Commission’s policy determinations, reaction to public sentiment,
and a desire to implement congressional policy.
In a 1995 report to Congress, the Sentencing Commission
recalled the environment in which the crack cocaine Guidelines were
enacted. The Commission noted that “[d]rug abuse in general, and
crack cocaine in particular, had become in public opinion and in
[Congress] members’ minds a problem of overwhelming
213
dimensions.” Additionally, Congress apparently believed that crack
214
cocaine was significantly more harmful than powder cocaine.
These sentiments led Congress to pass the 1986 Anti-Drug
215
Abuse Act, which strengthened mandatory minimum sentences for

212. See supra Part IV.B.1.
213. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 205, at 121.
214. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 90 (2002).
215. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18–21 U.S.C.).
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216

drug offenders. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act manifested Congress’s
particular apprehension toward crack cocaine. It treated the
possession of a gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to the possession
217
of one hundred grams of powder cocaine.
The Sentencing Guidelines, drafted shortly after the 1986 AntiDrug Abuse Act’s passage, were designed to mirror that legislation’s
disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine. In Kimbrough,
Justice Ginsburg explicitly observed that with respect to the crack
cocaine Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission deviated from its
usual method of calibrating the Guidelines based on the typical past
218
practice of sentencing judges. Instead, “[the Commission] employed
219
the 1986 Act’s weight-driven scheme.” Justice Ginsburg concluded
that, for this reason, “[t]he Commission did not use [an] empirical
approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking
220
offenses.” Consequently, the Court held that the specter of “closer
review” did not apply to the crack-powder sentencing disparity and
that sentencing judges could freely deviate from the crack cocaine
Guidelines based principally on policy grounds.
Likewise, the Guidelines governing the sentencing of whitecollar criminals were not based on the Sentencing Commission’s
assessment of empirical data and national experience. Rather, the
Commission explicitly chose to deviate from its ordinary quantitative
221
approach in calibrating these Guidelines. Instead of basing the
Guidelines on the past practice of sentencing judges, the Commission
applied its own independent assessment of the severity of white-collar
222
crime.
As a result, the Guidelines’ recommendations were
calibrated to yield sentences higher than those that previously had
223
been imposed on white-collar criminals. Subsequent adjustments to
the white-collar crime Guidelines only reinforced this departure from
224
the Sentencing Commission’s typical practice.

216. Id. § 1002, 100 Stat. at 3207–2 to –4 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006)).
217. Id.
218. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 567 (2007). For a description of the
Commission’s calibration of the Guidelines, see supra Part I.A.1.
219. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 567.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
224. See supra Part I.B.
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Neither the Guidelines governing crack-cocaine offenses nor
those governing white-collar crime resulted from the Sentencing
Commission’s consideration of judges’ past practice. Instead, these
Guidelines are a product of the political environment in which they
were promulgated, the Commission’s desire that the Guidelines
reflect perceived congressional policy, and the Commission’s own
independent policy determinations concerning the severity of a
particular class of conduct. Because neither of these sets of
Guidelines stemmed from the Sentencing Commission’s exercise of
its characteristic institutional role, they are not subject to the “closer
review” alluded to in the Supreme Court’s Kimbrough opinion.
2. The White-Collar Crime Guidelines and Congressional
Directives. Although the Commission’s desire to give effect to
congressional policy informed both the Guidelines governing whitecollar crime and those governing cocaine offenses, the Commission
did not promulgate either set of Guidelines pursuant to an explicit
congressional directive.
The crack-powder sentencing disparity originated with the 1986
225
Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Although Congress viewed the disparity as
sound policy with respect to statutory minimums and maximums, the
Kimbrough Court explicitly noted that the Act states nothing about
how the Commission should calibrate Guidelines sentences within
226
these brackets. Consequently, the Court rejected the government’s
argument, holding that it “lack[ed] grounding in the text of the 1986
227
Act.”
Likewise, the Commission likely did not promulgate the
Guidelines governing the sentencing of white-collar criminals in
response to an explicit congressional directive. Indeed, the initial
white-collar crime Guidelines had no statutory foundation beyond
that common to all sentencing guidelines: the 1984 Comprehensive
228
Crime Control Act.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prompted the Sentencing Commission
to revise the white-collar crime Guidelines, but it did so in the form of
an invitation rather than a demand. Sarbanes-Oxley stated that the

225. See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text.
226. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 571 (2007) (“The statute says nothing
about the appropriate sentences within these brackets. . . .”).
227. Id. at 571.
228. See supra Part I.A.1.
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Commission should ensure that the Guidelines “reflect the serious
229
nature of [white-collar] offenses” and should consider whether the
then-existing sentencing recommendations were “sufficient to deter
230
and punish such offenses.” This language likely does not rise to the
231
level of a true congressional directive. In any event, the Act confers
no congressional endorsement of the Guideline’s emphasis on the loss
calculation. Even if Sarbanes-Oxley is interpreted as truly directing
the Commission to ensure severe sentences for white-collar crimes,
sentencing judges should still be able to reject this recommendation
due to a policy disagreement with the Guidelines’ emphasis on the
problematic loss calculation and consider other factors they deem
more relevant to the seriousness of the crime.
CONCLUSION
Early cases indicate that appellate courts are upholding the
decisions of sentencing judges who, based on policy concerns, apply
Kimbrough to deviate from the white-collar crime Guidelines. If this
trend continues, courts could begin to move away from the
Guidelines’ distracting and destructive emphasis on the loss
calculation and toward sentences designed to achieve the purposes set
forth in § 3553(a).
United States v. Adelson provides an excellent example of this
232
phenomenon. At sentencing, Judge Rakoff refused to follow the
233
Guidelines’ recommendation that Adelson be imprisoned for life,
despite the finding that Adelson had caused a loss of between $50

229. White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. IX,
§ 905(b)(1), 116 Stat. 804, 805.
230. Id. § 905(b)(2), 116 Stat. at 805.
231. In dicta, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion observes that Congress has in the past directed the
Sentencing Commission to increase a guideline’s recommended sentencing range with respect to
Guidelines sentences for serious recidivist offenders. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 571. Ginsburg
notes that Congress directed the Commission to promulgate guidelines that yield a “substantial
term of imprisonment” to such offenders that is “at or near” the statutory maximum. Id. (citing
28 U.S.C. § 994(h)–(i) (2006)).
The language in Sarbanes-Oxley is less forceful. Sarbanes-Oxley instructs the
commission to “review” the Sentencing Guidelines, and make amendments “as appropriate.”
White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, § 905(a), 116 Stat. at 805. The ultimate
question of “whether the guideline offense levels . . . are sufficient” is left squarely to the
Sentencing Commission to determine. Id. § 905(b)(2), 116 Stat. at 805.
232. See United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). For a more
thorough discussion of Adelson, see supra notes 148–56.
233. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
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234

million and $100 million. Although Judge Rakoff’s decision was
235
based at least in part upon Adelson’s specific circumstances, his
opinion contained strong language deriding the Guidelines’ severity
236
and emphasis on factors such as the loss calculation. Specifically,
Rakoff observed that the Guidelines’ recommendation in Adelson’s
case exposed “the utter travesty of justice that sometimes results from
the [g]uidelines’ fetish with abstract arithmetic, as well as the harm
that guideline calculations can visit on human beings if not cabined by
237
common sense.”
The Second Circuit confirmed the reasonableness of Adelson’s
238
sentence. The Second Circuit held that in light of Kimbrough,
Adelson’s sentence is a valid result of Judge Rakoff’s considered
assessment of the propriety of the Guidelines’ recommendation in
239
light of the purposes of sentencing codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
In so holding, the Second Circuit acknowledged the potential
limitations of the Supreme Court’s Kimbrough holding but
nevertheless upheld Kimbrough’s application to the white-collar
240
crime Guidelines.
This trend should continue. The Sentencing Guidelines
pertaining to white-collar crime are deeply flawed. They recommend
ranges that are generally too high, and are too narrowly focused on
the loss calculation, an imprecise measure that poorly approximates a
241
defendant’s culpability. More sentencing courts should therefore
follow Judge Rakoff’s example, recognize the limitations of the
Guidelines regime, and use their post-Kimbrough discretion to
deviate from the Guidelines when necessary to achieve more just
sentencing outcomes.

234. See id. at 510 (finding a Guidelines loss calculation in an amount between $50 million
and $100 million).
235. See id. at 513 (considering the fact that Adelson joined the conspiracy only because “he
feared the effects of exposing what he had belatedly learned was the substantial fraud
perpetrated by others”).
236. See id. at 512–13.
237. Id. at 512.
238. United States v. Adelson, 301 F. App’x 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 441 F. Supp. 2d 506
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
239. Id. at 94–95.
240. Id.
241. See supra Part III.

